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PRIVACY AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS: 
WHY CHANGING EXPECTATIONS DEMAND 
HEIGHTENED STANDARDS 
GRAHAM JOHNSON* 
ABSTRACT 
Entertainment consoles, wearable monitors, and security systems. For 
better or worse, internet-connected devices are revolutionizing the 
consumer products industry. Referred to broadly as the Internet of Things 
(IoT), this ‘smart’ technology is drastically increasing the means, scope, 
and frequency by which individuals communicate their personal 
information. This Note explores the disruptive impact of IoT consumer 
devices on the U.S.’s patchwork system of privacy protections. After 
presenting a high-level survey of several key regulatory issues, this Note 
argues that the proliferation of IoT devices exposes a fundamental flaw in 
the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard. As individual 
expectations of privacy rapidly and inevitably deteriorate, societal norms 
will follow suit, resulting in a Fourth Amendment standard, which is 
incompatible and outdated in this new, interconnected reality. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 On the morning of November 22, 2015, Victor Collins was found 
dead, floating in a patio hot tub behind James Bates’ house in Bentonville, 
Arkansas.1 Bates said the two friends were hanging out and drinking the 
previous evening, and he believed that Collins had accidentally drowned 
in the hot tub sometime after Bates had gone to bed around 1:00AM. 
Police quickly suspected foul play. Investigators noticed curious water 
marks on the patio, suggesting Bates may have sprayed it down to clean 
up blood or other evidence. They also noted potential signs of a struggle in 
the living room.2 Despite the suspicious circumstances, however, the 
evidence was inconclusive.  
  
 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Washington University School of Law Class of 2019.  
1. Zuzanna Sitek & Dillon Thomas, Bentonville PD Says Man Strangled, Drowned Former 
Georgia Officer, 5 NEWS ONLINE (Feb. 23, 2016), http://5newsonline.com/2016/02/23/bentonville-pd-
says-man-strangled-drowned-former-georgia-officer/.  
 2.  Id. 
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What initially began as a typical murder investigation soon made 
national headlines. Investigators noticed that Bates had an Amazon 
Echo™ (a popular voice-activated speaker) set up in the living room 
where the struggle allegedly occurred. Believing the Echo might have 
inadvertently picked up and recorded some relevant evidence, 
investigators filed an administrative subpoena on Amazon, requesting the 
Echo’s records from that evening.3 Amazon pushed back against the 
request, asserting: “Given the important First Amendment and privacy 
implications at stake, the warrant should be quashed unless the Court finds 
that the State has met its heightened burden for compelled production of 
such materials.”4 Amazon’s defiant response reignited a heated national 
conversation about the competing interests between consumer privacy and 
law enforcement—a debate initially sparked by Apple’s high-profile 
refusal to unlock the San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone just one year 
earlier.5  
This time, however, the debate quickly subsided. Whatever data the 
Echo™ might have picked up became moot, as a different “smart” 
Internet-connected device provided investigators with the information they 
believed they needed to disprove Bates’ story. Each new home in 
Bentonville came pre-installed with an Internet-connected utility meter. 
The meter “measure[d] and record[ed] the exact consumption of electricity 
and water per hour,”6 which it then transmitted to the local utility company 
for processing and storage.7 Hoping to shed some light on the patio water 
marks, investigators filed an administrative subpoena on the utility 
company. Unlike Amazon, the utility company did not challenge the 
request. The data revealed that on the night of Collins’ death, 140 gallons 
of water were used at Bates’ home between 1:00 – 3:00AM, while only 10 
gallons were used while the men were awake together earlier in the 
evening. Investigators interpreted the excessive water usage to indicate 
foul play, suggesting the usage “was consistent with spraying down the 
back patio area.”8 Bates was subsequently charged with first-degree 
murder and tampering, at least in part on the basis of the utility meter 
evidence.9 
 
 
 3. Kim Lacapria, Amazon Fights Subpoena for Alexa Data in Murder Investigation, SNOPES 
(Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.snopes.com/news/2017/02/23/amazon-subpoena-alexa-data-murder/.  
 4. Id. 
 5.  Amy B. Wang, Police Land Amazon Echo Data in Quest to Solve Murder, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 
9, 2017, 11:08 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/technology/ct-amazon-echo-murder-wp-
bsi-20170309-story.html.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.  
 9. However, the charges against Bates were eventually dismissed by the prosecution. In an 
interesting turn of events, Bates recently filed a lawsuit against the city of Bentonville and several 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/8
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Casual Echo™ owners and privacy advocates alike were relieved that 
Amazon pushed back against the Bentonville investigators’ request, but 
the fact that investigators believed they solved the case merely by 
analyzing data from an innocuous and unavoidable Internet-connected 
utility meter raises fresh questions of its own. How much data do Internet-
connected devices collect about us in our daily lives? What does that data 
look like and reveal about us? How exactly is personal data collected, 
stored, and protected, both from malicious hackers and governmental 
interests? Perhaps most significantly, do we have any say over whether 
this data is collected in the first place?  
These questions lie at the heart of the rapid technological development 
and societal implementation of intra- and Internet-connected devices, 
referred to broadly as the “Internet of Things” (IoT). There is no single, 
comprehensive definition for the Internet of Things. The Federal Trade 
Commission defines it as an “interconnected environment where all 
manner of objects have a digital presence and the ability to communicate 
with other objects and people.”10 The analytics firm McKinsey Global 
Institute defines the IoT: “[S]ensors and actuators connected by networks 
to computing systems.”11 The term is used both as a noun (e.g. the Internet 
of Things as an interconnected environment of devices) as well as an 
adjective (e.g. an IoT device). In this note, the IoT is most often used in 
the latter format as a descriptive term for consumer products (known 
colloquially as “smart” devices) that collect user data via built-in sensors 
and convey that data, both to each other and/or to centralized locations, 
through the Internet.  
Part I will analyze the prevalence of consumer-oriented IoT devices in 
our society, discussing the diverse classes of data collected by IoT devices, 
the extensive scope of IoT data collection, and the various systems 
facilitating data collection. Part II will summarize four pressing real-world 
issues at the forefront of the IoT debate: 1) Unavoidable and 
comprehensive IoT data collection; 2) Lack of notice to consumers and 
general public ignorance of the extent of IoT data collection; 3) Inadequate 
data security facilitating targeted hacking and threatening the evidentiary 
 
 
individuals involved in the murder investigation. Bates alleges that Bentonville police officers falsified 
reports and fabricated the results of an autopsy to make it appear as though Collins’ death was a 
homicide. He maintains Collins’ death was an accidental drowning. Tracy Neal, Suit Accuses Police in 
Arkansas of Plot to Frame Man for Murder, NW. ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Jan. 28, 2019), 
https://www.nwaonline.com/news/2019/jan/28/suit-accuses-bentonville-police-of-plot/. 
 10. Jamie Lee Williams, Privacy in the Age of the Internet of Things, 41 HUM. RTS. 14, 16 
(2015). 
 11. James Manyika et al., The Internet of Things: Mapping the Value Beyond the Hype, 
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. 1, n.1 (2015). 
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validity of IoT data; and 4) Unfair and unethical evidentiary inferences 
enabled by the admission of IoT data. Part III will outline the current legal 
landscape surrounding the IoT and the current trends and standards with 
regard to the admissibility of IoT data. Part III will also touch on the 
FTC’s regulatory powers in the IoT sphere, the self-policing trends within 
the IoT product industries, and the limited regulatory roles of state and 
federal legislatures.  
Part IV will then explore why the prevailing Fourth Amendment legal 
standard underlying privacy rights, namely an individual’s protection 
against warrantless searches and seizures where that individual has a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy,”12 is a fundamentally flawed approach 
to protecting privacy interests in light of the complex issues presented by 
IoT data collection. This Note will argue that the reasonable expectation 
standard is theoretically outdated due to shifting social norms, as well as 
practically ineffectual given the nature and degree of data collection by 
IoT devices. Instead of continuing to rely on an outdated legal standard, 
this Note advocates for a shift in the way the courts assess privacy 
interests in the IoT sphere. Rather than focus on subjective expectations of 
privacy, courts should instead consider an individual’s right to privacy as a 
function of his or her right to control when, how, and to what extent their 
personal information is communicated to others.13  
I. OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
While the phrase “Internet of Things” may be foreign to some, it is far 
from an unfamiliar concept in our increasingly interconnected society. 
Simply put, any device that 1) has a unique Internet Protocol (IP) address 
and 2) can connect to the Internet and transfer data with any degree of 
complexity is classified as an IoT device.14 IoT devices, which can be both 
wired and wireless, utilize sensors to gather various forms of data, send 
the data across the Internet, and use the data to execute specific 
functions.15 Cell phones, wearable devices (e.g. FitBits™ and Apple 
Watches™), entertainment consoles (e.g. the Amazon Echo™ and smart 
TVs), household goods (e.g. smart kitchen appliances and Nest™ utility 
meters), and security cameras are just a few of the more common IoT 
devices we (intentionally or unintentionally) interact with on a daily basis. 
 
 
 12. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A] person has a 
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”).  
 13. See generally Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, 25 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 166 (1968). 
 14. ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44227, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2015). 
 15. Melissa W. Bailey, Seduction by Technology: Why Consumers Opt out of Privacy by 
Buying into the Internet of Things, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1023 (2016).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/8
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The value of these sorts of consumer-oriented IoT devices is fairly well 
understood by those who use them—convenience, safety, task automation, 
cost efficiency, and entertainment all contribute to the rise in IoT 
popularity.  
On a larger scale, IoT technology will substantially contribute to a 
more integrated and functional social infrastructure,16 promising ground-
breaking developments in transportation, increases in industrial 
productivity, improved energy conservation, increased agricultural 
productivity and food supply, and improved community safety.17 
Estimates of the current total number of IoT devices vary, but it is clear 
that the number is going to skyrocket in the near future; one analytics firm 
projects that there will be over 26 billion connected devices by 2020,18 
while others place the projected total between 40.9 and 212 billion by the 
same year.19 The economic value of the IoT is equally difficult to quantify. 
Estimates by the McKinsey Global Institute, taking into consideration the 
potential value of IoT technology across nine major settings, projects an 
annual economic value between $3.9 trillion - $11.1 trillion by 2025.20 
While this projection incorporates some degree of speculation with regard 
to industries like transportation, which relies on an assumption that there 
will be widespread implementation of IoT-enabled autonomous vehicles, 
one area that is already exploding in popularity is home goods and 
services, valued between $200–$350 billion annually by 2025.21 
Encompassing this estimate is a valuation of IoT-facilitated chore 
automation, energy management, and home security.22 Consumer products 
will be the focal point of this note.  
While the IoT promises exciting developments in all facets of society, 
“privacy and security concerns [are] growing at an unparalleled rate”23 due 
 
 
 16. FISCHER, supra note 14. 
 17. Christian S. McMeley, Protecting Consumer Privacy and Information in the Age of the 
Internet of Things, 29 ANTITRUST 71, 72 (2014). 
 18. Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things,’ FORBES (May 13, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-
anyone-can-understand/#d4987661d091. 
19. See McMeley, supra note 17, at 72; see also Comments of the Staff of the Fed. Trade 
Comm’ns Bureau of Consumer Protection, In the Matter of the Internet of Things and Consumer 
Product Hazards, No. CPSC-2018-007, (June 15, 2018) [hereinafter Consumer Protection Bureau 
Comments], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/comment-staff-federal-
trade-commissions-bureau-consumer-protection-consumer-product-
safety/p185404_ftc_staff_comment_to_the_consumer_product_safety_commission.pdf (estimating 55 
billion IoT devices by 2025).  
 20. Manyika et al., supra note 11, at 2. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Williams, supra note 10, at 14. 
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to the rapid development and implementation of IoT devices. The privacy 
concerns implicated by IoT devices are numerous, yet often difficult to 
isolate and address. Many IoT devices directly collect sensitive personal 
information, including location data, financial information, and personal 
health information.24 In some cases, this automatic, comprehensive data 
collection is advertised as a feature—for example, FitBits™ collect a 
significant amount of intimate information about users, including location 
data and personal information like “steps walked, calories burned, activity 
intensity, sleep [habits], and other health and fitness metrics.”25 However, 
like other IoT devices, the personal data collected by FitBits™ has the 
potential to be used for less-than-benign purposes, including 
discrimination by employers, insurers, and lenders.26  
Additional privacy concerns stem from inferential capabilities and 
data aggregation: “The collection of personal information, habits, 
locations, and physical conditions over time . . . may allow an entity that 
has not directly collected sensitive information to infer it.”27 In other 
words, discrete data points collected by IoT devices can be combined with 
other sources of input to “present a deeply personal and startlingly 
complete picture of each of us . . . .”28 Data aggregation is discussed 
further in Part II.D. 
From a security standpoint, IoT devices pose tangible risks by, among 
other things, “1) [E]nabling unauthorized access and misuse of personal 
information; 2) facilitating attacks on other systems; and 3) creating safety 
risks.”29 No Internet-connected devices are immune from hacking, no 
matter how innocuous they appear. These security risks will be further 
explored in Part II.C. 
Consumers of IoT products are generally “unaware of the full extent 
of the privacy that they are trading and to whom their privacy is being 
sold.”30 Both the consumers and the sellers are to blame for this 
unfortunate reality, although not necessarily in equal parts. Sellers tend to 
intentionally make it difficult for customers to inform themselves of how 
their data is collected and utilized. In particular, they often hide their 
 
 
 24. Id.  
 25. Nicole Chauriye, Wearable Devices as Admissible Evidence: Technology is Killing Our 
Opportunity to Lie, 24 CATH. U. J. L. & TECH. 495, 497 (2016). 
 26. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford, & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 
CAL. L. REV. 735 (2017); Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward 
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 118 (2014). 
 27. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN 
A CONNECTED WORLD, 14 (Jan. 2015) [hereinafter  FTC STAFF REPORT]. 
 28. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Federal Trade 
Commission Internet of Things Workshop (Nov. 19, 2013). 
 29. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 27, at 10. 
 30. Bailey, supra note 15, at 1034. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/8
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privacy policies or make them difficult to read.31 Additionally, it is often 
in sellers’ best interests to keep their data gathering practices as secretive 
and comprehensive as possible—consumers may not be happy that their 
personal data is being bought and sold without their knowledge, but 
personalized consumer data (facilitating highly targeted ads) is the ‘new 
oil’ amongst internet marketers in the severely under-regulated data 
brokerage industry.32 On the other hand, the risks associated with IoT data 
collection are, at least in part, self-imposed consequences resulting from 
consumers’ implicit or explicit valuation of the convenience of IoT 
products over the various concerns associated with their use.33 For 
example, a consumer who installs a motion-activated security camera in 
their fenced-in backyard should not be surprised when it records them 
mowing the lawn. Regardless of fault, the main issue here is not that 
consumers are oblivious to the fact that IoT devices are gathering 
information, but rather they do not grasp the full extent of data collection 
and the implications of that collection regarding their privacy interests.  
II. ISSUES IN IOT DATA COLLECTION 
Each of the following sections are the sole subjects of several different 
studies and articles in the growing body of literature on the IoT. My 
intention here is merely to introduce each issue to highlight the diverse 
and unexpected privacy implications of everyday IoT devices, because 
they are all relevant to the theoretical discussion in Part IV.  
A. Unavoidable & Comprehensive IoT Data Collection  
IoT consumer products are a growing source of information for law 
enforcement investigators due to the comprehensive nature of their data 
collection processes. As one commenter puts it, the “ubiquitous devices 
can serve as a legion of witnesses, capturing our every move . . . .”34 The 
CEO of Enlightened, a company that produces sensor-equipped LED light 
 
 
 31. Peppet, supra note 26, at 139–143 (highlighting the difficulty of locating privacy policies 
and manufacturers’ usage of unclear, ambiguous language in policies).  
 32. See Paul Boutin, The Secretive World of Selling Data About You, NEWSWEEK (May 30, 
2016), http://www.newsweek.com/secretive-world-selling-data-about-you-464789; Andrew Guthrie 
Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805, 817 
(2016) (“Mapping consumer interests at an extremely personal level has become a growing and quite 
lucrative business, with many big technology companies jumping into the field.”).  
 33. See generally Bailey, supra note 15. 
 34. Justin Jouvenal, Commit a Crime? Your Fitbit, Key Fob or Pacemaker Could Snitch on 
You, CHICAGO TRIB. (Oct. 9, 2017, 7:48 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-
FitBit™-key-fob-pacemaker-crime-20171009-story.html. 
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systems, stated: “We can literally tell you how every square foot is 
occupied every second of every day.”35 The aforementioned Bates case is 
just one of several recent cases highlighting the potential impact of 
unavoidable IoT data collection in the context of criminal prosecutions. 
For instance, in September 2016, an Ohio man claimed that a fire began in 
his home while he was sleeping. Suspecting arson, the police filed a search 
warrant to get data from his pacemaker: “Authorities said his heart rate 
and cardiac rhythms indicated the man was awake at the time he claimed 
he was sleeping. He was charged with arson and insurance fraud.”36  
In another recent case, a Connecticut man named Richard Dabate was 
found guilty of murdering his wife after “data from the home’s ‘alarm 
system, computers, cellphones, social media postings and [his wife’s] 
FitBit™ [created] a timeline that contradicted [his] statements to 
police.’”37 Dabate claimed that an intruder had chased his wife into the 
basement and shot her immediately after she returned home from an 
exercise class; however, after gathering data recorded on her FitBit™, 
detectives determined that “she had walked 1,217 feet after returning 
home from the exercise class, far more than the 125 feet it would take her 
to go from the chair in the garage to the basement in [Dabate’s] telling of 
what happened.”38 As if that wasn’t enough, “The FitBit™ also registered 
Connie moving roughly an hour after [Dabate] said she was killed before 
9:10 a.m.”39  
While two of these three cases ultimately resulted in net positive 
outcomes—putting away a murderer and an arsonist—the means by which 
these convictions came about are troubling. Consider again the Bates case, 
in which the prosecution’s ‘key’ piece of evidence was water usage data 
gathered from a pre-installed smart utility meter.40 While seemingly 
innocuous, smart meter data “can reveal the activities and behavioral 
patterns of a household . . . . [T]he detailed information contained in smart 
meter data can provide police with infinitely more insight into people’s 
homes.”41 Bates did not choose to install the meter and certainly did not 
voluntarily disclose the information contained therein, but nonetheless, 
 
 
 35. Immanuel Kim, The Internet of Things: A Reality Check for Legal Professionals, LAW 
PRACTICE TODAY (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.lawpracticetoday.org/article/the-internet-of-things-a-
reality-check-for-legal-professionals/. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Mary Ann Georgantopoulos, A Fitbit Helped Police Arrest a Man for His Wife’s Murder, 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 25, 2017, 3:37 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/maryanngeorgantopoulos/FitB
it-murder?utm_term=.cgeEejG#.pm05rJx.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Wang, supra note 5. 
 41. Natasha H. Duarte, The Home Out of Context: The Post-Riley Fourth Amendment and Law 
Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter Data, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1140, 1140–41 (2015). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/8
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that data eventually sealed his fate (that is, of course, until the prosecution 
was dismissed).42 Similarly, the pacemaker case suggests that individuals 
with serious heart problems face the unnerving prospect of the only piece 
of equipment keeping them alive recording discoverable evidence 24/7.  
These concerns will increase exponentially in coming years as IoT 
devices continue to grow in popularity and diversity. For instance, 
Amazon announced its Echo Dot™ (mini Echo speakers) was its best-
selling product of the 2017 holiday season, and the ‘Alexa’ phone app (the 
Echo’s primary user interface) was briefly the most downloaded 
application on Apple’s App Store.43 Whether an individual owns a 
particular product or not, exposure to IoT device data collection in both 
public and private settings is becoming unavoidable as they seamlessly 
integrate into our social infrastructure.  
B. Lack of Notice of IoT Data Collection 
A major part of the problem with pervasive, unavoidable IoT data 
collection is the lack of transparency on the part of those doing the 
collecting. Manufacturers of IoT products have little interest in disclosing 
to their consumers just how much data manufacturers are collecting about 
consumers—nor, in most instances, are there any federal regulations 
explicitly requiring manufacturers to do so.44 In 2015, the FTC announced 
it would not require consumer notification practices “before collecting and 
using consumer data for practices that are consistent with the context of a 
transaction or the company’s relationship with the consumer.”45 The FTC 
report acknowledged that consumer notice and choice of privacy settings 
are important,46 but it did not want to stifle the growth and development of 
IoT technology, while also noting: “these data uses are generally 
consistent with consumers’ reasonable expectations.”47  
This particular conclusion stands in stark contrast to a statement made 
by Former FTC Commissioner Julie Brill just a few months earlier:  
 
 
 42. Neal, supra note 9. 
 43. Raymond Wong, Amazon’s Echo Dot and Alexa Voice Assistant Ruled this Holiday 
Season, MASHABLE (Dec. 27, 2017), http://mashable.com/2017/12/27/amazon-echo-dot-alexa-smart-
home-top-holiday-2017-gift/#.fj3GD3Kxsqp. 
 44. Bailey, supra note 15, at 1032 (“Furthermore, there does not currently exist federal 
regulation requiring manufacturers to notify consumers about when or what types of data are collected 
when the collected information is used for a purpose consistent with the transaction.”). 
 45. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 27, at 40. 
 46. See Kim, supra note 35 (“The FTC urges industry-initiative self-regulations of the IoT 
implementations. The recommendations include: 1) a privacy-by-design approach; 2) minimized 
collection and retention of consumer data; 3) notice of data use and sharing; and 4) consumer’s choice 
on data use.”). 
 47. Bailey, supra note 15, at 1032. 
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On the Internet of Things, consumers are going to start having 
devices . . . that [are] connected and sending information to a 
number of different entities, and the consumer may not even realize 
that they have a connected device or that the thing that they’re using 
is collecting information about them.48 
In effect, the FTC simultaneously acknowledges that consumers may not 
realize they are using an IoT device (let alone one that is collecting and 
sending their data to a third party), while also asserting that when 
consumers use said devices, companies are not under any obligation to 
provide notice of data collection if the consumer could ‘reasonably expect’ 
that the data collection was being used for purposes ‘consistent with the 
context of the transaction.’49 The effect of the FTC’s laissez-faire approach 
to consumer notice provisions is that manufacturers can generally choose 
what information they disclose about their data collection practices. 
Consumers are usually bound to the manufacturer’s terms via contracts of 
adhesion, meaning as soon as consumers start using a device, they are 
presumed to have consented to the terms of use.50 In other words, 
consumers are presented with a ‘choice,’ but that choice is little more than 
the manufacturer stating “take it or leave it”—either accept the terms of 
use, or don’t use the product. 
Even if a consumer wants to find out the kinds of data the 
manufacturer is collecting, they will face several obstacles. First, given the 
small physical size of most consumer-oriented IoT devices, manufacturers 
often cannot display privacy notices on the device or packaging itself.51 
Accordingly, if consumers want any information, they have to seek out the 
manufacturer’s privacy policy from some external source (often the 
manufacturer’s website), a process Noah Peppet suggests is easier said 
than done: “[F]or several of the products reviewed it was extremely 
difficult to even locate a relevant privacy policy.”52 In addition, the terms 
of these privacy policies are often ambiguous and unclear, utilizing 
differing definitions of “personal information” across devices and 
consequently misleading consumers about how their data is shared or sold 
to third parties.53 Manufacturers maintain wide, unilateral discretion with 
 
 
 48. Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Silicon Flatirons Conference: The 
New Frontiers of Privacy Harm (Jan. 17, 2014). 
 49. The FTC does, however, recommend data minimization practices (i.e. limiting the quantity 
of data collection and the period of data retention) due to the “increased risk that the data will be used 
in a way that departs from consumers’ reasonable expectations.” FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 27, at 
35.  
 50. Bailey, supra note 15, at 1033. 
 51. Peppet, supra note 26, at 140. 
 52. Id. at 141. 
 53. Id. at 142. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/8
 
 
 
 
 
2019] PRIVACY AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS 355 
 
 
 
 
regard to the “third parties” or “partners” with whom they share collected 
data, and consumers generally have no way of even finding out who those 
third parties may be, let alone assess their data security practices or how 
they process and utilize the personal data they eventually receive. 
These practices can have significant implications for consumer 
privacy interests. For example, in 2015, Samsung Group came under fire 
after an anonymous internet user pointed out that the privacy policy for the 
popular Samsung SmartTV™, a television with a built-in Voice 
Recognition feature, contained an eerie disclaimer: “Please be aware that 
if your spoken words include personal or other sensitive information, that 
information will be among the data captured and transmitted to a third 
party through your use of Voice Recognition.”54 To put that disclaimer in 
context, “[t]hat means if you decide to go ‘live in the future’ and turn on 
Game of Thrones with just your voice, the TV will translate that speech to 
text and whatever else you say and send the data to third-party 
companies.”55 The privacy policy goes on to state: “Samsung is not 
responsible for these providers’ privacy or security practices,” distancing 
itself from any accountability for the third party’s use of their consumers’ 
potentially private information.  
Fortunately, the FTC has since taken note of questionable data 
collection practices in the smart TV industry. In 2017, VIZIO, Inc. 
settled56 with the FTC after the FTC alleged VIZIO installed software on 
its TVs which collected individualized, second-by-second viewership data 
without notifying its users.57 Per the terms of the FTC consent decree, 
VIZIO agreed to implement notice and consent procedures, along with a 
data deletion policy and a comprehensive privacy program.58 
  
 
 
 54. Darren Orf, Samsung’s SmartTV Privacy Policy Raises Accusations of Digital Spying, 
GIZMODO (Feb. 8, 2015, 2:30 PM), https://gizmodo.com/samsungs-smart-tv-privacy-policy-raises-
accusations-of-1684534051.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction & Monetary Judgment, FTC v. Vizio, Inc., No. 
2:17-cv-00758 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2017) [hereinafter FTC Stipulated Order]. 
 57.   In addition to selling TVs without notifying consumers of the built-in “automated content 
recognition” (ACR) data collection software, VIZIO remotely installed the ACR software on 
previously-sold TVs, again without consumer notification. VIZIO then sold the viewing history to 
various third parties, in part to facilitate targeted advertising to particular consumers based on their 
television viewing data. Complaint for Permanent Injunction & Other Equitable and Monetary Relief, 
FTC v. Vizio, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00758, 4–5 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2017).  
 58. FTC Stipulated Order, supra note 56, at 4 (“[P]rior to collecting any Viewing Data, 
[VIZIO] must: Prominently disclose to the consumer, separate and apart from any ‘privacy policy,’ 
‘terms of use’ page, or other similar document, (1) the types of Viewing Data that will be collected and 
used, (2) the types of Viewing Data that will be shared with third parties; (3) the identity or specific 
categories of such third parties; and (4) all purposes for Defendants’ sharing of such information.”). 
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Although the VIZIO enforcement action may be a signal that the FTC 
is slowly shifting its stance on data collection notice requirements, it 
remains to be seen whether the decree will have a demonstrable impact in 
the broader IoT industry. VIZIO’s conduct was particularly egregious, and 
complex data processing relationships can often make it difficult to 
determine exactly where the burden of consumer notice should lay. For 
example, Amazon is notably secretive about the full parameters of its data 
collection practices, and is currently working with a number of third-party 
companies (including home security system sellers, toy manufacturers, 
and health trackers) to incorporate Alexa into their IoT products.59 
Amazon maintains that their devices do not have the technical capacity to 
record and store any ambient conversations without first triggering the 
devices to listen, but regardless, everything intentionally said to the 
device—purchases, questions, messages to other Echo™ users, reminders, 
alarms, etc.—are recorded and stored on the users’ Amazon account.60 
With each new third party processor comes an added layer of 
complication, and an added level of practical difficulty in effectuating 
adequate consumer notice. Is Amazon obligated to notify users of any 
third-party products incorporating Alexa technology every time that 
product collects consumer data? Or should the burden fall on the third-
party product manufacturer? As new IoT technologies proliferate and 
interconnect, these questions will become more and more difficult to 
answer.61  
C. Inadequate Data Security 
The FTC identifies three categorical security risks posed by IoT 
devices.62 The first is unauthorized access to IoT devices and misuse of 
personal information.63 Poor security in IoT devices and data transactions, 
both on the consumer and server side, can enable intruders to compromise 
user credentials or otherwise hack into the device in order to gather stored 
 
 
 59. Electronic Privacy Information Center, EPIC Letter to the Attorney General and the FTC 
Chairwoman (July 10, 2015), https://epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/EPIC-Letter-FTC-AG-Always-
On.pdf.  
 60. Janko Roettgers, Relax: Your Amazon Echo Isn’t Recording Everything You Say, VARIETY 
(Dec. 27, 2016, 3:01 PM), http://variety.com/2016/digital/news/amazon-echo-spying-privacy-
1201948926/.  
 61. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 27, at 22. 
As one participant observed, when “a bunch of different sensors on a bunch of different 
devices, on your home, your car, your body . . . are measuring all sorts of things,” it would be 
burdensome both for the company to provide notice and choice, and for the consumer to 
exercise such choice every time information was reported. 
Id. 
 62. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 27, at 10. 
 63. Id. at 10–11. 
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or transmitted information.64 This problem is exacerbated if the device 
stores or transmits financial information or personally identifiable 
information, as both can be used to facilitate further identity theft or 
fraud.65  
Some companies seek to protect consumers by “de-identifying” user 
data, or processing and storing data without revealing the identity of the 
individual source.66 However, the effectiveness of de-identification in the 
IoT sphere questionable: “[D]e-identification is not a perfect solution 
because in most of the de-identified datasets, the information can be re-
identified.”67 As Peppet asserts, “Preliminary research suggests that robust 
anonymization of Internet of Things data is extremely difficult to achieve, 
or, put differently, that re-identification is far easier than 
expected.”68While the actual risk and efficacy of re-identification 
techniques are still being debated,69 IoT devices often collect “high-
dimensional data”70 about user behaviors, facilitating the ease of any 
targeted attempts at re-identification—particularly when combined with 
publicly-available information.71   
The other major security concern implicated by IoT devices is the 
potential for malicious intrusion and criminal misuse of the devices. IoT 
 
 
 64. Consumer Protection Comments, surpa note 19, at 7.  
The FTC has also recommended that companies consider risks at the point where a service 
communicates with an IoT device, such as the interface between the device and the cloud. 
Security experts have long warned against attack vectors such as cross-site scripting attacks, 
where malicious scripts are injected into otherwise trusted websites, and cross-site request 
forgery attacks, where unauthorized commands are sent from a user the website trusts. 
Id. 
 65. Mario Ballano Barcena et al., Security Response, How Safe is Your Quantified Self?, 
SYMANTEC (Aug. 11, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/sec
urity_response/whitepapers/how-safe-is-your-quantified-self.pdf.  
 66. Ann Cavoukian & Daniel Castro, Big Data and Innovation, Setting the Record Straight: 
De-identification Does Work 1 (June 2014), http://www2.itif.org/2014-big-data-deidentification.pdf. 
 67. Bailey, supra note 15, at 1030. 
 68. Peppet, supra note 26, at 130. 
 69. Compare Cavoukian & Castro, supra note 66; with Arvind Narayana & Edward Felten, No 
Silver Bullet: De-identification Still Doesn’t Work (July 9, 2014), 
http://randomwalker.info/publications/no-silver-bullet-de-identification.pdf.  
 70. “High-dimensional data” is defined as a dataset consisting of numerous data points about 
each individual such that each individual record is likely to be unique. One example is mobility data 
collected periodically by cell phone providers. Each time a cellphone connects with a cell phone tower 
and transmits its location, it adds another data point to the users’ dataset. In this context, re-
identification would consist of analyzing as few as two discrete location data points to identify the 
user—for instance, by determining the location of their home and place of work. Narayana & Felten, 
supra note 69, at 4. 
 71. Cavoukian & Castro, supra note 66, at 3 (“[I]t is admittedly very difficult to de-identify 
mobility traces [and high-dimensional data] . . . due to their high degree of uniqueness. In the case of 
high-dimensional data, additional arrangements may need to be pursued, such as making the data 
available to researchers only under tightly restricted legal agreements.”).  
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devices may create hazards through the loss of a critical safety function, 
loss of connectivity, or degradation of data integrity.72 Additionally, 
consumer IoT devices are susceptible to intrusion by any number of well-
known methods (failing to change default passwords, inadequate firewall 
protection, phishing attacks, etc.) or more sophisticated means 
(coordinated DDoS attacks, brute force hacking, etc.).73 Even if the 
network is well-protected, specific devices may not be; many IoT devices 
share similar characteristics to WIFI routers, specifically with regard to 
default usernames and passwords, and individual devices can be targeted 
with startling precision and concerning results. For example, “[In August 
2013,] a creepy dude hacked into a Houston family's Web-connected baby 
monitor to call a 2-year-old a ‘little slut.’ The family was using a ‘high 
quality video and audio’ camera made by China-based Foscam.”74 While 
hacking into baby monitors is certainly on the creepier end of the 
spectrum, the implications could be life threatening as well: “[D]octors for 
former Vice President Dick Cheney ordered the wireless functionality of 
his heart implant disabled due to fears it might be hacked in an 
assassination attempt.”75 The U.S. Food and Drug Association now 
includes cybersecurity protection as one of several evaluation criteria for 
approval of medical devices.76 
 
 
 72. For instance: 
[A] car’s braking systems might fail when infected with malware, carbon monoxide detectors 
or fire alarms might stop working with the loss of connectivity, and corrupted or inaccurate 
data on a medical device might pose health risks to a user of the device. Consumers’ physical 
safety could also be at risk if an intruder had access to a connected lock, garage door, or 
burglar alarm. 
Consumer Protection Bureau Comments, supra note 19, at 2. 
 73. For example: 
Hackers used the Mirai botnet—composed of IoT devices, such as IP cameras and routers, 
infected with malicious software—to engage in a distributed denial of service (“DDoS”) 
attack of unprotected residential building management systems in Finland. By blocking 
Internet access, hackers sent these connected management systems into an endless cycle of 
rebooting, leaving apartment residents with no central heating in the middle of winter. Also, 
earlier this year, researchers discovered vulnerabilities in Internet-connected gas station 
pumps that, when remotely accessed, would allow hackers not only to steal credit card 
information but also change the temperature and pressure in gas tanks, potentially causing 
explosions. 
Id. at 3; see also G.G. Veerendra, Hacking Internet of Things (IoT): A Case Study on DTH 
Vulnerabilities, SECPOD https://www.secpod.com/resource/whitepapers/Hacking-IoT-A-Case-Study-
on-Tata-Sky-DTH-Vulnerabilities.pdf; The 5 Worst Examples of IoT Hacking and Vulnerabilities in 
Recorded History, IOT FOR ALL (May 10, 2017), https://www.iotforall.com/5-worst-iot-hacking-
vulnerabilities/. 
 74. Kashmir Hill, Baby Monitor Hack Could Happen to 40,000 Other Foscam Users, Forbes 
(Aug. 27, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/08/27/baby-monitor-hack-could-
happen-to-40000-other-foscam-users/#28c6069758b5.  
 75. Herbert B. Jr. Dixon, The Wonderful and Scary Internet of Things, 56 JUDGES J. 36, 37 
(2017). 
 76. Id.  
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Several federal and state-level regulations codify requirements to 
reasonably protect certain information, including the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (FCRA), Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Electronic 
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, and the Fair and 
Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA).77 However, none of these 
statutory schemes specifically cover IoT data. Instead, the existing 
protections are generally limited to specific content (e.g., FCRA only 
protects personally identifiable credit report information78), or specific 
types of data processors (e.g., HIPAA only applies to entities that 
electronically process health insurance information79). Even where IoT 
data could reasonably fall within the parameters of a statute, rigid statutory 
schemes fail to account for the unique nature of IoT data collection. For 
example, FitBits™ collect everything from an individuals’ daily running 
routes, to eating habits, sleeping patterns, symptom searches, and cadence 
of a person’s walk or run—unquestionably personal health information—
but FitBit is not covered by HIPAA because it is not a “covered entity”: 
“[M]uch consumer-generated health information created from apps or 
devices falls outside the reach of HIPAA and the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH).”80 
While statutory schemes are largely ineffective, some federal agencies 
are attempting to safeguard IoT data from malicious breaches by imposing 
liability on IoT manufacturers. As previously noted, the FTC is 
“empowered and directed to prevent [certain] persons . . . from using 
unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”81 The FTC’s 
authority to pursue “unfair or deceptive acts” appears to be one of the 
primary vehicles through which the federal government will attempt to 
hold IoT manufacturers accountable: “With the vast amount of data 
generated by the Internet of Things and the unending string of data 
breaches, the FTC has increased the use of its Section 5 authority to ensure 
businesses are implementing ‘reasonable’ security measures.”82 The FTC 
 
 
 77. McMeley, supra note 17, at 76. 
 78.   16 C.F.R. § 682.3(a) (2004) (“Any person who maintains or otherwise possesses consumer 
information for a business purpose must properly dispose of such information by taking reasonable 
measures to protect against unauthorized access to or use of the information in connection with its 
disposal.”). 
 79. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2003) (providing that the HIPAA Security Rule applies only to the 
following entities: health plan, health care clearinghouse, health care provider who transmits any 
health information in electronic form, and business associates). 
 80. McMeley, supra note 17, at 74.  
 81. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006). 
 82. McMeley, supra note 17, at 74.  
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has already applied its Section 5 authority in one IoT-related data breach 
action signaling to other manufacturers that they may be on the hook for 
inadequate security measures.83 Regardless, as more IoT products (and 
producers) flood the market, the potential for breaches inevitably rises—
maintaining adequate data security is a continuous process, and the IoT is 
no exception.  
D. Potential for Discrimination & Improper Evidentiary Inferences 
While the aforementioned Dabate case demonstrates some of the 
positive, pragmatic capabilities of IoT data in facilitating criminal 
prosecutions, one concerning implication associated with IoT data is the 
potential for improper and unfair evidentiary inferences. For example, 
Nichole Chauriye suggests IoT data was improperly admitted in 
Commonwealth v. Risley.84 In 2015, a woman named Jeannine Risley 
reported that she was sexually assaulted by a masked intruder while 
staying overnight at her boss’ home.85 During the subsequent 
investigation, the police found Risley’s FitBit™ lying in the hallway. 
Upon the investigators’ request, Risley provided her FitBit’s™ password 
as well as her consent to search and collect the electronically stored data.86 
After reviewing the data, the police concluded: “[T]he data retrieved from 
the device indicated that she may have been walking around at the time of 
the alleged attack.”87 This contradicted her claim that she was woken from 
bed by the attacker. Risley was later charged with making false statements, 
and the FitBit™ data was introduced as proof that she had lied about the 
attack.88 Chauriye suggests that the introduction of the FitBit™ data was 
prejudicial to Risley, and perhaps unconstitutional: 
  
 
 
 83.    In re Trendnet, Inc., No. 122-3090, 2013 WL 4858250 (F.T.C. Sept. 3, 2013). In 2013, the 
FTC filed a complaint under Section 5 of 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) against TRENDnet, a company which sold 
sensor-equipped IP security cameras. The cameras were accessible via remote log-in, allowing users to 
access live feeds. The FTC alleged, inter alia, that TRENDnet failed to establish reasonable security 
measures, specifically by transmitting and storing user login credentials in clear, readable text over the 
Internet. Hackers exploited the vulnerability to gain access to 700+ camera feeds. The FTC settled 
with TRENDnet, imposing substantial notification, reporting, and security requirements on the 
company.  
 84. Chauriye, supra note 25, at 496 (citing Commonwealth v. Risley, Criminal Docket: CP-36-
CR-0002937-2015 (Lancaster Cty., Pa, printed Nov. 16, 2015)).  
 85. Sophie Kleeman, Woman Charged with False Reporting After Her FitBit Contradicted Her 
Rape Claim, MIC NEWS (June 25, 2015), http://bit.ly/1SNAeLY. 
 86. Chauriye, supra note 25, at 510.  
 87. Id. at 509–10.  
 88. Id. at 510. 
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While the FitBit™ contradicts her statements; it does not prove that 
she lied. The events of that night could still have happened as she claims. 
The fact is that FitBits™, and other wearable technology, log data in 
certain time increments, but fail to capture the exact details of what 
happens during a particular time. It is for this reason that allowing such 
data from wearable technology to be admitted as evidence is severely 
flawed and may cause an unfair bias against the owner of the technology.89 
This case poses a troubling dilemma. On one hand, if Risley did 
fabricate the rape claim, as the evidence tends to suggest, then the FitBit™ 
data is valuable to the extent that it supports her criminal prosecution. On 
the other hand, if the attack actually happened but Risley simply forgot or 
misremembered some of the details, or alternatively, if the data was faulty 
or misleading,90 then the use of the FitBit™ data becomes a kind of 
malicious form of victim-blaming, leading to criminal charges stemming 
solely from Risley’s trivially inaccurate recollection of a deeply traumatic 
event.91  
Criminal prosecutions are not the only ways in which IoT data can be 
used against consumers to their detriment. Another growing area of 
concern is IoT-facilitated discrimination in the insurer-insured and 
creditor-debtor contexts: 
If the [IoT] creates many new data sources from which unexpected 
inferences can be drawn, and if those inferences are used by 
economic actors to make decisions, one can immediately see the 
possibility of seemingly innocuous data being used as a surrogate 
for racial or other forms of illegal discrimination.92  
Creditors may not actually know an applicant’s race, but they could 
easily guess that race based on “where and how a person drives, where and 
how that person lives, or a variety of other habits, behaviors, and 
characteristics revealed by analysis of data from a myriad of IoT 
devices.”93 Aggregated IoT data can therefore be used as a proxy for 
otherwise impermissible racial or class-based discrimination, even if those 
impermissible factors are never actually referenced. In the insurer-insured 
context, the use of IoT data in pricing determinations is already being 
implemented—car insurance companies allow drivers to travel with 
 
 
 89. Id.  
 90. Katherine E. Vinez, The Admissibility of Data Collected from Wearable Devices, 4 
STETSON J. ADVOC. & L. 24 (2017). 
 91. Chauriye, supra note 25, at 511.  
 92. Peppet, supra note 26, at 123–24. 
 93. Id. at 124. 
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devices that track speed and location data, and while the service is 
purported to help lower insurance premiums, it can just as easily be used 
to raise insurance rates if the device records any instances of aggressive 
driving.94 
IoT data also has the potential to be used for discriminatory purposes 
in employment contexts. FitBit’s™ “wellness program” service for 
employers is one potential example. Through these programs, employers 
can establish company-wide health milestones or fitness goals for their 
employees to reach.95 Employers may then either offer FitBits to 
employees (or permit employees to opt in), providing incentives to 
employees who hit the established metrics.96 While there may be 
beneficial individual and company-wide results if utilized properly, “these 
data carry the inherent risk of ‘reveal[ing] physical disabilities, illnesses, 
or conditions like pregnancy,’ and some employers have already fired 
employees ‘who engage in behavior likely to raise the employer’s health 
insurance costs.’”97 Accordingly, employees are faced with a lose-lose 
situation—choose not to participate and lose out on incentives (in addition 
to possible social ostracization), or opt in to the program and run the risk 
of private or latent health issues coming to light and adversely impacting 
employment status. Again, while wearable technologies undoubtedly have 
beneficial effects for millions of active users, a certain degree of trust must 
necessarily be placed in the companies collecting the data: “Consumer 
privacy experts have already expressed concern that the information 
collected by companies like FitBit is so detailed that it could ‘enable 
companies to do everything from accurately guessing your credit rating to 
pricing an insurance premium.’”98  
Successfully stating an actionable claim of discrimination based on 
IoT data aggregation would be next to impossible—not only is it 
becoming increasingly difficult to ascertain what, where, and how 
personal data is being collected, but neither traditional antidiscrimination 
laws nor data processing regulations like FRCA (to be discussed in Part 
III) prohibit employers, lenders, insurers, creditors, and other entities from 
utilizing IoT data in formulating their decisions.99  
  
 
 
 94. Bailey, supra note 15, at 1031. 
 95. See id. at 1030–31. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Chauriye, supra note 25, at 496. 
 99. Peppet, supra note 26, at 128; see also Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford, & Jason Schultz, 
Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CAL. L. REV. 735 (2017) (proposing three statutory frameworks 
for addressing legal deficiencies in employee privacy protections). 
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III. CURRENT LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF IOT 
DATA 
To review, I have provided an abridged explanation of some of the 
more significant privacy issues associated with individual and collective 
use of IoT products. While the aforementioned issues are tangible 
concerns, IoT products are here to stay—and rightfully so. By any 
objective measure, the economic, technological, and societal value of IoT 
products (both current and predictive) is simply too great to prudently 
hamper via excessive governmental regulation.100 However, while 
technical issues like inadequate data or device security may be fixable by 
taking concrete, tangible precautions,101 I would argue that the IoT poses 
irreconcilable philosophical issues in light of long-standing norms in the 
diverse body of privacy theory. The next sections will explore this area in 
two parts; in Part III, by outlining the current legal framework surrounding 
the IoT and the evidentiary admissibility of IoT data, and in Part IV, by 
explaining how the current standards are, at the very least, inconsistent 
with the philosophical underpinnings of privacy jurisprudence.  
A. IoT Data as Evidence 
The previous sections, and specifically the Bates, Dabate, and Risley 
cases, provide snapshots of the potential evidentiary value of IoT data. In 
each of those cases, police found a device near the scene of the crime, filed 
a subpoena for the device’s electronically stored data with the third-party 
processor, and, once the request was granted, utilized the data in the 
subsequent prosecution. The standards for accessing stored IoT data under 
current federal regulations are less stringent than those for acquiring a 
warrant. The Stored Communications Act, enacted as Title II of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),102 provides 
several means by which police can compel the disclosure of certain 
electronically stored information (ESI). If the requested ESI is less than 
180 days old, a formal warrant supported by probable cause is required.103 
If, however, the ESI is more than 180 days old, police can access the data 
by filing a formal warrant, filing an administrative subpoena, or by 
requesting the ESI through a court order.104 Both of the latter two options 
 
 
 100. See Duarte, supra note 41. 
 101. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, CAREFUL CONNECTIONS: BUILDING SECURITY IN THE 
INTERNET OF THINGS (2015).  
 102. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–10 (2018). 
 103. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2018). 
 104. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2018). 
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require a lower burden of proof than a formal warrant; where the warrant 
requires a showing of probable cause, the administrative subpoena and 
court order merely require the police to show that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the information requested is ‘relevant and material’ 
to an ongoing criminal investigation.105 There are typically some logistical 
hurdles to overcome with regard to the collection and admissibility of ESI 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, namely establishing the relevancy of 
ESI, assessing its accuracy, and authenticating the data.106  
Perhaps the most contentious evidentiary consideration is establishing 
the reliability of ESI, particularly in the context of ESI produced by IoT 
devices. Some scholars assert that data gathered by IoT devices is almost 
always going to be reliable, as sensors simply record inputs and transmit 
the information as they are programmed to do.107 For them, the bigger 
problem is the inferences that can be drawn from the collected data, 
particularly when those inferences are for discriminatory or prejudicial 
purposes.108 This is certainly true with devices like smart utility meters and 
fixed GPS location trackers in cars—for example, the fact that Bates used 
140 gallons of water between 1:00 and 3:00A.M. is an objectively 
verifiable fact which the meter accurately recorded, but the troubling issue 
is that police attempted to frame the water usage data as evidence of a 
cover-up in order to support their (allegedly falsified) theory of the case.  
On the other hand, others argue that IoT devices are inherently 
unreliable, and gathered data should only be used in limited circumstances 
to supplement, dispute, and rarely (if ever) to replace witness testimony.109 
Any number of occurrences could make IoT data unreliable. The sensor 
itself may make a technical error, or the collected data may become 
 
 
 105.    The statute provides: 
A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court that is a 
court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific 
and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of 
a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant 
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018). 
 106.    See generally Michael Arnold & Dennis R. Kiker, The Big Data Collection Problem of 
Little Mobile Devices, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10 (2015); Neda Shakoori, Wearables: Your Next Trial 
Witness? S.F. DAILY J. (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.mcmanislaw.com/Templates/media/files/PDFs/
McManis-Faulkner-DJ-12-10-14.pdf; Katherine E. Vinez, The Admissibility of Data Collected from 
Wearable Devices, 4 STETSON J. ADVOC. & L. 1 (2017). 
 107.    Peppet, supra note 26, at 128 (“Accuracy, however, is really not the problem with Internet 
of Things sensor data. One’s FitBit, driving, or smart home sensor data are inherently accurate—there 
is little to challenge.”). 
 108.    Id. 
 109.    Shakoori, supra note 106 (“With the potentially inaccurate or incomplete narrative of a 
user’s activities, it seems the use of wearable-generated data may be best served when supplemented 
with a more traditional form of evidence, testimony from the user or witnesses, such as the user’s 
medical doctor.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/8
 
 
 
 
 
2019] PRIVACY AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS 365 
 
 
 
 
corrupted and degrade in accuracy over time.110 Alternatively, devices like 
FitBits™ may inaccurately assess input data and record something that did 
not actually happen: “A wearable device could log a user as having walked 
three miles, when the user was actually just shuffling his feet back and 
forth at his workstation.”111 Inaccurate records such as these could have 
major implications in the future with regard to insurance claims and other 
proceedings where FitBit™ data is sought, and we have already seen at 
least one contentious case involving potentially unreliable data—
commenters still debate the veracity and reliability of the FitBit™ data 
used in the Risley case.112  
B. The Constitutionality of IoT Data Collection 
The constitutional questions surrounding the collection and use of IoT 
data are equally as unsettled. Most prominent among these questions is 
how the IoT fits within the existing standards for searches and seizures 
under the Fourth Amendment.113 In Katz v. United States114, decided in 
1967, the Supreme Court recognized that an individual’s right to freedom 
from unwarranted governmental searches and seizures depends on that 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Justice Harlan’s concurring 
opinion in Katz established what has since become known as the 
reasonable expectation standard, now utilized to assess whether a search 
occurs under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment: “[T]here is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and second, that the expectation be one that society 
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”115 In effect, the reasonable 
expectation standard turns on societal, rather than individual 
expectations—any individual bringing a Fourth Amendment challenge can 
claim that they subjectively believed their communications were private—
thus the standard is theoretically malleable and capable of adjustment by 
the courts according to shifting societal norms and expectations.116  
 
 
 110.    Consumer Protection Bureau Comments, supra note 19, at 2 (citing CONSUMER PROD. 
SAFETY COMM’N, POTENTIAL HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH EMERGING AND FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES, 
16 (Jan. 18, 2017)).  
 111.    Id. 
 112.    Compare Chauriye, supra note 25, with Vinez, supra note 90. 
 113.    U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 114.    Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the defendant exhibited a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversations while in a closed telephone booth, such that a 
government-planted listening device in the booth violated his Fourth Amendment rights). 
 115.    Id. at 361. 
 116.    Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, HARV. L. 
REV. 482 (2011) (“When changing technology or societal practice expands police power, threatening 
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The Katz decision and the reasonable expectation standard superseded 
the Trespass Doctrine, the prevailing privacy standard established forty 
years prior to Katz in Olmstead v. United States117 Under the Trespass 
Doctrine, a search under the Fourth Amendment only took place if the 
government physically trespassed on an individual’s protected property 
interest. If there was no physical trespass by the police or a particular 
surveillance device, then there was no technical “search.” However, the 
Supreme Court recently evoked the Trespass Doctrine in United States v. 
Jones,118 holding that a GPS device physically planted on the defendant’s 
car, used to monitor his location for several weeks, constituted a search 
under the Fourth Amendment. Rather than decide the case based on the 
Katz reasonable expectation standard, the majority took a very narrow 
approach to the issue, effectively deciding the case based on the physical 
intrusion alone.119  
In Jones, Justice Sotomayor authored an influential concurring 
opinion in which she criticized the majority for punting on the issue of 
whether the surveillance via the GPS tracker itself constituted an 
unreasonable search, while also expressing concern about the possibility 
of data aggregation revealing more about an individual through inferential 
connections than the initial surveillance alone might suggest possible: “I 
would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be 
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to 
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual 
habits, and so on.”120 Sotomayor presciently asserted: “GPS monitoring 
generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements 
that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, 
religious, and sexual associations.”121 While Sotomayor’s argument spoke 
specifically to GPS trackers, the device in question could just as easily be 
replaced by any number of IoT devices discussed in this note—FitBits™, 
Amazon Echos™, and even smart utility meters all have the capability to 
generate “comprehensive records” of our daily lives. However, because 
 
 
true, as well. When changing technology or social practice restricts police power, threatening public 
safety, courts can loosen Fourth Amendment rules to achieve the same goal.”). 
 117.    Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding that a search and seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment did not occur where the government physically placed wiretaps on two of the 
defendant’s phone lines because the taps were situated beyond the limits of his property). 
 118.    United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 119.    Id. at 404–05 (“We hold that the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s 
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’ It is 
important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied private 
property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion 
would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was 
adopted.”). 
 120.    Id. at 416.  
 121.    Id. at 415. 
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the Court declined to conclusively hold that comprehensive surveillance 
by means of data aggregation constitutes an unreasonable search under the 
Katz, Sotomayor’s concurrence is little more than an artful articulation of 
a problem that will only be exacerbated by IoT technology.  
The last major doctrinal issue in the relationship between the IoT and 
the Fourth Amendment concerns the Third Party Doctrine. First 
established in United States v. Miller,122 the Third Party Doctrine 
maintains that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in information voluntarily disclosed to a third party, thus a warrant 
supported by probable cause is generally not required to obtain 
information held by third parties.123 In the IoT context, this means that 
when an individual voluntarily interacts with a device and that interaction 
is transmitted to a third party company for processing, the individual 
theoretically relinquishes any expectation of privacy they had in the 
disclosed information. Consequently, where direct, contemporaneous 
police surveillance of an individual via their IoT devices may implicate the 
Fourth Amendment’s reasonable expectation standard, simply gathering 
the same data after the fact directly from the third party company would 
not.124 As of yet, there are no explicit protections for IoT device 
information under existing constitutional law, thus traditional third party 
rules apply.125 
There is a possibility this may change in the future, however. The 
Supreme Court recently declined to extend the Third Party Doctrine to 
historical location data gathered by cellphone towers.126 In Carpenter, the 
Court recognized that “historical cell-site records present even greater 
privacy concerns than the GPS monitoring of a vehicle we considered in 
Jones,”127 thus a warrant is required to obtain location records from 
cellphone providers. Chief Justice Roberts opined that the location data 
gathered by cellphone towers is comprehensive in scope and ubiquitous 
for all cellphone users, thus it is not comparable to the sort of limited 
information at issue in typical third-party cases: “There is a world of 
difference between the limited types of personal information addressed in 
Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information 
 
 
 122.    United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 123.    Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563–64 
(2009). 
124.    Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 
104 CAL. L. REV. 805, 840 (2016). 
 125.    Id. 
 126.    Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).  
 127.    Id. at 2218.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
368      WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 11:2 
 
 
 
 
casually collected by wireless carriers today.”128 However, the Court 
stressed that its decision was narrow: “We do not disturb the application of 
Smith and Miller or call into question conventional surveillance techniques 
and tools, such as security cameras. Nor do we address other business 
records that might incidentally reveal location information.”129 
Accordingly, it remains to be seen whether Carpenter’s holding will be 
extended to other categories of personal information disclosed to third 
parties; until then, information picked up or shared with an IoT device 
presumptively falls beyond Fourth Amendment protections with regard to 
ex post facto police investigations. 
IV. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY INTERESTS 
In light of long-standing jurisprudential norms underlying the 
development of privacy rights in the U.S., the current legal and 
constitutional standards fail to adequately protect individual privacy 
interests implicated by the collection of IoT data. So far, I have discussed 
privacy at length, but have not actually defined it—this is not because of 
some “big reveal” at the end of the note, but rather because the idea of 
privacy cannot be adequately captured in one definition, and I have 
admittedly used it in several different contexts throughout the course of 
this note. Neil Richards writes: “In recent years, many scholars have 
settled on an understanding of privacy as an umbrella term that 
encompasses a variety of related meanings.”130 Privacy is used to refer to 
property interests—the protection of the sanctity of one’s home and 
possessions from unwanted intrusions. More broadly, privacy can refer to 
an individual’s autonomy over their own bodies, relational and political 
associations, sexual orientations, confidences, thoughts, secrets, beliefs—
all values we intuitively and instinctively hold sacred from unwanted 
disclosure to the public. Richards argues that we innately value intellectual 
privacy, or “the protection from surveillance or unwanted interference by 
others when we are engaged in the process of generating ideas and 
forming beliefs—when we’re thinking reading, and speaking with 
confidants before our ideas are ready for public consumption.”131  
In any case, while it may be difficult to define, one fundamental aspect 
of privacy is that “it has a basic and intuitive feel to it.”132 For example, we 
are naturally inclined to view something like hacking into a baby monitor 
 
 
 128. Id. at 2219. 
 129. Id. at 2220.  
 130. NEIL M. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 9 (2015) [hereinafter RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY].  
 131. Id. at 95. 
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and yelling profanities at an infant as a gross invasion of privacy,133 as 
well as a constantly-listening SmartTV™ transferring the contents of 
every conversation in its immediate vicinity to some unidentified third 
party data processor for less-than-clear purposes.134 We are equally likely 
to abhor the idea of an employer, unbeknownst to an employee, using their 
personal FitBit™ data to discover the employee was pregnant and 
subsequently firing them under some pretextual rationale. While the 
conceptions of privacy between these three examples vary—reflecting 
privacy of intimate spaces, conversations, and personal health information 
respectively—we intuitively value them and believe they should be 
protected.  
I would argue that we should view the government’s ability to access 
stored IoT data with impunity during criminal investigations as an equally 
grave invasion of individual privacy interests. As explained in Part III.A, 
the Stored Communications Act provides that the disclosure of 
electronically-stored information may be compelled by administrative 
subpoena, which requires that the investigators demonstrate a showing of 
mere ‘relevance’ to an ongoing investigation. And as the Bates case 
demonstrates, even if the data was collected without knowledge or consent 
(e.g. by a pre-installed smart utility meter), it is still discoverable and 
admissible at trial. Furthermore, even if that data is inherently unreliable 
(like the FitBit™ in the Risley case), or can be aggregated to reveal far 
more about an individual than one would reasonably assume possible (as 
Sotomayor points out about the GPS tracker data in Jones), neither the 
Federal Rules of Evidence nor the U.S. Constitution provide an adequate 
shield against the admissibility of that data. In fact, since the Third-Party 
Doctrine is still good law, the official stance of the Supreme Court on this 
issue is that we cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information shared and processed by IoT manufacturers—even, 
presumably, information we had no idea we were disclosing in the first 
place.135  
A great deal of literature has already been written about the Third-
Party Doctrine and the various problems associated with its application to 
modern technologies,136 and it may indeed face a major shake-up in the 
aftermath of the Carpenter decision.137 Accordingly, I will not belabor the 
various doctrinal and philosophical qualms here. However, even if legal or 
 
 
 133. See id. at 13. 
 134. See id. at 12. 
 135. Ferguson, supra note 124, at 840. 
 136. Id. at 831–832 fn. 165.  
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regulatory changes are made concerning the government’s access to IoT 
data in coming years, the problem of surveillance via IoT devices remains 
an unresolved and ever-present issue in the IoT sphere.138  
In other words, the government may request ESI from an entity after 
the fact, or alternatively, it could actively monitor the user’s behavior by 
simultaneously intercepting data transmitted by any number of IoT 
devices.139 The emphasis here is on the latter of the two possibilities; even 
if the standards surrounding the acquisition of ESI for prosecutorial 
purposes are heightened, the current standards for the interception of IoT 
data, as it is simultaneously being communicated with its intended 
destination (namely the device’s data processer), remain ill-equipped to 
protect individual privacy interests. The Katz reasonable expectation 
standard is outdated and cannot adequately respond to the various ways in 
which IoT products will inevitably be used in criminal investigations in 
coming years. Furthermore, the Trespass Doctrine has a very limited 
applicability, and is largely irrelevant in the era of sophisticated and 
ubiquitous wireless transmission of data.140  
The reasonable expectation standard necessarily relies on societal 
expectations, but our societal expectations are shifting in ways that run 
contrary to the privacy interests we value, largely in part due to the 
pervasiveness and intrusiveness of IoT devices in our daily lives. Where 
we would have once been appalled by the idea of a speaker that was 
constantly listening to our conversations, even if it was only listening for a 
particular word or phrase, the Echo Dot™ was the most popular product in 
the 2017 holiday season on the world’s largest online retailer’s website.141 
In light of the Samsung SmartTV™ controversy, one commenter astutely 
notes: “Depressingly enough, all of this is just more evidence that ‘yes, if 
 
 
 138. To clarify, surveillance by malicious actors via IoT devices is a distinct threat in and of 
itself, as discussed in Part IIC. That threat concerns the broad realm of cybersecurity and inadequate 
protections within individual IoT devices and their respective networks. The threat of surveillance as 
discussed here concerns the government using consumer IoT products for surveillance-oriented 
purposes during active investigations.  
 139. Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated: “In the future, 
intelligence services might use the [internet of things] for identification, surveillance, monitoring, 
location tracking, and targeting for recruitment, or to gain access to networks or user credentials.” 
Spencer Ackerman & Sam Thielman, US Intelligence Chief: We Might Use the Internet of Things to 
Spy on You, GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/09/internet-
of-things-smart-home-devices-government-surveillance-james-clapper.; Former CIA Director David 
Petraeus stated: “[IoT] items of interest will be located, monitored, and remotely controlled through 
technologies such as radio-frequency identification, sensor networks, tiny embedded servers, and 
energy harvesters—all connected to the next-generation internet using abundant, low-cost, and high-
power computing . . . [household spy devices] change our notions of secrecy [and prompt a rethink] of 
our notions of identity and secrecy.” Spencer Ackerman, CIA Chief: We’ll Spy on You Through Your 
Dishwasher, WIRED (Mar. 15, 2015, 5:35 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/03/petraeus-tv-remote/.  
 140. Ferguson, supra note 124, at 838. 
 141. See Wong, supra note 43.  
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your smart gadget is connected to the internet, then it’s probably collecting 
data on you.’ So Samsung’s privacy admission suddenly turns from 
surprise to status quo.”142 We keep our smart phones with us at all times, 
constantly transmitting our location data to our service providers.  
In addition to the information we willfully (or inadvertently) disclose 
to third party vendors, we are now cognizant of the realities of dragnet 
NSA surveillance.143 Where it was once a common, yet lighthearted joke 
across online message boards and social media platforms to say that 
someone was “on a list” after making a questionable or inflammatory 
comment, a Pew Research Center poll from 2015 found that 65% of 
Americans believe that there are not adequate limits on “what telephone 
and internet data the government can collect. . . . The majority view that 
there are not sufficient limits on what data the government gathers is 
consistent across all demographic groups.”144  
In sum, we value privacy and intimacy within our homes and amongst 
our relationships, yet we are becoming more and more accepting of 
intrusive IoT devices in our daily lives while simultaneously becoming 
more aware of and accepting of the fact that the government can (and 
does) have a nearly unlimited ability to intercept the data our IoT devices 
transmit. If our expectation of privacy is constantly and rapidly 
diminishing, how can we continue to apply the Katz reasonable 
expectation standard and rely on it to hold any weight? If we bring IoT 
devices into our private spaces, aware of their capacity for third party and 
governmental surveillance, how can we continue to reasonably expect 
privacy in conversations taking place in the vicinity of these devices?  
Concededly, these concerns are tempered somewhat by Supreme 
Court decisions extending Fourth Amendment protections to other 
sophisticated surveillance techniques. Perhaps most relevant to the IoT 
context is Kyllo v. United States,145 in which the Court held that the use of 
a high-tech thermal imaging device to scan a suspect’s home for the 
presence of high-intensity lamps (used for indoor marijuana growth) 
constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stated: “Where, as here the 
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore 
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without 
 
 
 142. Orf, supra note 54. 
 143.       See generally NSA Spying, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/n
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 144. Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and 
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physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant.”146 Scalia further reiterated: “We have 
said that the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the 
house.’”147 One could make an argument that surveillance via IoT devices 
is comparable to the thermal imaging device at issue in Kyllo—such a 
practice would reveal  “details of the home” that were otherwise 
unknowable without physical intrusion, thus mandating a warrant.   
While Scalia suggested the presence of a bright-line rule protecting the 
interior of the home, his opinion in Kyllo (and the precedent cited therein) 
relied on the Katz standard in reaching its conclusion: “[I]n the case of the 
search of the interior of homes—the prototypical and hence most 
commonly litigated area of protected privacy—there is a ready criterion, 
with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy 
that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable.”148 But what 
happens if this “minimal expectation of privacy” erodes entirely? What if 
we collectively decide that privacy, as we once knew it, is dead?149 So 
long as Fourth Amendment protection is conditioned on an expectation of 
privacy—and a societal acknowledgment that the expectation is 
reasonable—Scalia’s suggestion that a bright-line rule exists is 
fundamentally premature.  
To reconcile this issue, I suggest we return to our roots. In 1890, 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis co-authored The Right to Privacy,150 
one of the most influential articles on privacy rights in U.S. history and a 
guiding force behind the development of the four privacy torts in Prosser’s 
Restatements.151 Concerned about the increasingly invasive and offensive 
“gossip” industry in the press, the two scholars advocated for the 
development of codified privacy tort laws.152 The article suggested that 
individuals have “a general right . . . to be let alone,”153 while asserting 
 
 
 146. Id. at 40 (emphasis added). 
 147. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)). 
 148. Id. at 34. 
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https://www.industryweek.com/technology/privacy-dead-invasive-technology-here-stay; Jacob 
Morgan, Privacy Is Completely And Utterly Dead, and We Killed It, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2014), 
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that preexisting property rights protect both tangible and intangible 
interests—interests encompassed by the nebulous term “[one’s] inviolate 
personality.”154 The article also identified the framework for the privacy 
theory known broadly as Information Privacy:155 “The common law 
secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what 
extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to 
others.”156 Rather than view privacy as an emotional or theoretical ideal, 
they viewed it as an actual and innate right to choose when, how, and to 
whom one disclosed their personal information. 
While Warren and Brandeis’ article had a noticeable impact in the 
development of U.S. privacy rights, their conceptualization of privacy as 
autonomy over the disclosure of personal information was far from novel. 
The idea of privacy as an individual property right, and more 
fundamentally, the idea of property as a secure, controllable interest of a 
sole individual, has roots reaching as far back Aristotle’s writings.157 
Aristotle identifies four conditions that must be met to qualify fully as 
being ‘wealthy,’ (1) and (2) speak not just to wealth, but ownership in 
general; (3) maintains that one’s properties must be secure; and (4) 
Maintains that one’s properties are one’s own.158 As translated by Miller, 
“A criterion of ‘security’ is possession in a given place and in such a 
manner that the use of the objects is up to oneself; and a criterion of ‘being 
one’s own or not’ is when the alienation of it is up to oneself.”159 If we 
view property as the fundamental right to security and alienability of our 
possessions, and if we consider privacy as a kind of possessory interest in 
our personal information as Warren and Brandeis suggest, their conclusion 
that privacy is more accurately understood as a property interest stands on 
firm logical and philosophical grounds.  
I would advocate for a return to this line of thinking as privacy law 
continues to fluctuate in our increasingly interconnected, IoT-enabled 
world. We should not be asking what society reasonably expects to be 
private, as social norms are changing as rapidly as our new technologies 
are developing. Instead, when we analyze whether a search occurs under 
the Fourth Amendment such that a warrant is necessary, we should focus 
on the individual and how they choose to disclose (or not disclose) their 
personal information. In other words, only if an individual knowingly and 
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voluntarily discloses information with an IoT device, and only if they are 
cognizant of the kinds of inferences that can be made from that data, 
should that information fall beyond the constitutional safeguard of the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. To be clear, I am not the first to 
advocate for a shift towards an information privacy-oriented scheme,160 
nor do I offer much in terms of specific suggestions to effectuate such a 
scheme—I am simply arguing here that the proliferation of IoT devices 
makes the necessity of reconceptualizing existing privacy standards all 
that more urgent. If we view privacy rights in this way as control over 
one’s information, rather than what a judge believes society would expect 
to be private, we can eliminate the risk of new technologies shifting our 
social norms in ways that conflict with the privacy values we instinctively 
and naturally wish to protect.  
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